We take a new look at the comparison between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We show that, when the elasticity of the inverse market demand equals the curvature of the inverse market demand weighted by the Lerner Index, a generic Stackelberg leader sets the same quantity and earns the same profit as a generic Stackelberg follower. When the curvature of the inverse market demand equals the total number of firms in the industry, a coincidence among the quantities produced by a first mover, a second mover, and a generic firm facing Cournot competition occurs.
Introduction
The Cournot (1838) equilibrium and the Stackelberg (1934) equilibrium are two of the most used equilibrium concepts in oligopoly theory. The main di¤erence between the two consists in the timing of players'moves: they are simultaneous in the former and sequential in the latter. As a result, market performance and pro…t distribution under the two settings signi…cantly di¤er. Gal-Or (1985) , Dowrick (1986) and Mailath (1993) have compared the roles of leader and follower in terms of equilibrium payo¤s showing that the pro…tability of taking the lead crucially depends upon the slope of …r m s ' r e a c t i o n functions: in the presence of downward (upward) sloping reaction functions, …r m s always …n d it more pro…table to take the lead (follow). 1 In his pioneering paper on contests and tournaments, Dixit (1987) has shown that the incentive for strategic manipulation of e¤ort depends upon the relative curvatures of the other player's best response function and one's own payo¤ contours. He contemplated the possibility that players do not have a strategic incentive for precommitment to e¤ort locally away from the Nash level, also discussing possible applications to oligopoly.
In this paper, we take a new look at the comparison between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. By applying the Lagrangean approach, we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium under general demand and cost functions. We show that, when the elasticity of the inverse market demand equals the curvature of the inverse market demand weighted by the Lerner Index, a generic Stackelberg leader sets the same quantity and earns the same pro…t as a generic Stackelberg follower. Then, we proceed with a comparison between the outcome of the sequential game and the outcome of the simultaneous game showing that, when the curvature of the inverse market demand equals the total number of …r m s in the industry, a coincidence among the quantity produced by a generic leader, the quantity produced by a generic follower, and the quantity produced by a generic …r m facing Cournot competition occurs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the setup, the analysis and the main results. Section 3 concludes.
The Model
We consider a scenario where multiple Stackelberg leaders simultaneously and independently choose output levels before multiple Stackelberg followers simultaneously and independently choose output levels given the leaders'total output. The set of …r m s is P = F [ S, where F is the set of …r s t movers and S is the set of second movers. There are N F 1 leaders and N S 1 followers, with N = N F + N S denoting the total number of …r m s in the industry. The inverse market demand for a homogeneous product is de…ned by p : R + ! R + . For every industry output Q 2 R + this function speci…es the market clearing price p(Q); with p
This, under the Cournot-Nash assumption, consists in setting the pro…t maximizing quantity taking as given the quantities of the rivals. The follower j's pro…ts are de…ned by j = pq j c. The …r s t order condition (assuming an inner solution exists):
implicitly de…nes the follower j's reaction function. The second order condition is satis…ed if:
which can be rewritten:
where = Q (p pp =p p ) is the curvature of the inverse market demand (or slope elasticity) and s j = q j =Q is the market share of a generic follower. It is worth noting that the slope elasticity is related to the log-concavity of the direct demand: the direct demand is log-concave in the price if and only if 1, otherwise the direct demand is log-convex. 2 The leader i's programme consists in the maximization of its own pro…ts, i = pq i c, under the constraint given by (1) . The Lagrangian function obtains:
The …r s t order conditions for an inner solution to exists are:
Thanks to the property of symmetry among followers, the property of symmetry among leaders, and the de…nition of industry output, we get:
Since N > 1, a necessary condition for the above proposition to hold is that the direct demand be log-convex. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, when = N, the slope of follower j's reaction function, R j (q i ), is nil, implying that a non-monotone reaction function is required. 4 As an illustration of the above proposition, we consider an example where the inverse market demand is given by p = 1=Q, with = 2 and " = 1, N = 2 and c p = 1. By solving the system of …r s t order conditions (5) the Stackelberg equilibrium quantities obtain: q i = q j = 1=4. It is straightforward to verify that the resulting Cournot solution coincides with the Stackelberg solution. 5 This result is anticipated in Figure 3 of Dixit (1987) where, exactly as in our example, the slope of R j (q i ) is nil when evaluated at the Nash equilibrium.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has dealt with two of the most used equilibrium concepts in oligopoly theory, namely Stackelberg and Cournot. We have identi…ed the conditions under which the outcome of a simultaneous quantity game and the outcome of a sequential quantity game turn out to be identical, i.e., there is neither an advantage nor a disadvantage for …r m s to take the lead. 4 From (3), second order conditions pertaining to the Stackelberg follower are satis…ed as long as p p < c pp . Second-order e¤ects should also be taken into account to ensure that the generic Stackelberg leader has no incentive to set a quantity level di¤erent from the simultaneousmove equilibrium level (see Baye and Shin, 1999 and Dixit, 1999) . By evaluating the second order derivative of the payo¤ function of a generic Stackelberg leader, i = p(q i ; R j (q i ))q i c, at the point where = N, a necessary condition for the generic Stackelberg leader to precommit to the Nash equilibrium quantity level turns out to be: R 
